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THE DRAMA REVISITED 
LUDWIG VAN DEN HAUWE
THE HAYEK–KEYNES DEBATE: LESSONS FOR CURRENT BUSINESS CYCLE  
RESEARCH. BY JOHN P. COCHRAN AND FRED R. GLAHE. LEWISTON, N.Y.:
EDWIN MELLEN PRESS, 1999.
THE TIMELINESS AND CONTINUING RELEVANCE
OF AUSTRIAN BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY
Careful study of the book under review is a rewarding experience. AsRoger Garrison points out in the Foreword (pp. iii–vii), Austriancapital-based business cycle theory has lost nothing of its relevance
and timeliness. The theory identifies monetary mismanagement as a major
source of economywide distortions in the intertemporal allocation of re-
sources by focusing on the relative-price effects—and the corresponding
quantity adjustments—of a monetary disturbance, as compared to tracking
the movements in macroeconomic aggregates that conceal those relative-price
effects. It thus gives us a superior understanding of the real coupling between
the short-run and the long-run macroeconomic pictures and of the nature of
business cycles. Despite the book’s title, and although the authors treat
Keynes’s ideas not unsympathetically, the outlook adopted in the book is
Hayekian rather than Keynesian and the authors’ thesis is basically that
“Hayek was right” (p. vi).
Substantive theoretical and methodological insights are intertwined in the
book. In their discussion of the use of the equilibrium construct or the method
of praxeology, the authors do not hesitate to combine citations from both
Mises’s and Hayek’s writings (see chap. 11, pp. 151–67). Surely this approach
will appear disputable to at least some readers. Recently several authors have
argued in favor of a dehomogenization of the respective contributions of
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Hayek and Mises to economic theory (Salerno 1993; Block and Garschina
1996). Cochran and Glahe do not situate their work as belonging to this trend.
Although they rely primarily on the original writings of the two leading actors
in the drama, they use the writings of Mises and Rothbard as additional pri-
mary source material on the Austrian approach to economics, monetary the-
ory, and the nature of the business cycle (p. xiii).
The book brings together sources that to some Austrians may appear
hardly compatible, if not inconsistent. Insiders know that there are some
significant differences between the views of, say, Mises, Hayek, and Lachman,
even with respect to method and methodology. However, the book integrates
these different Austrian sources into a relatively coherent picture. The fact that
the authors do not want to enter in any depth into issues presently under
debate within the “Austrian” School itself may be explained by the fact that
they intend to address their book to the economics profession at large rather
than to the inner circle of convinced Austrians. The drawback of this strategy is
that the reader will not find in the book answers relating to questions that have
been intensely debated recently within Austrian economics itself.
One such controversy relates to the appropriate use and interpretation of
the equilibrium construct and, in particular, to the question concerning
whether or not the market harbors a tendency toward equilibrium. How
should the equilibrium construct be used and interpreted?  
As Cochran and Glahe state at the beginning of chapter 11 (pp. 151–67) they
intend equilibrium to mean the equilibrium of the economic system in the
sense in which it is used in Lachman (1976, p. 151, n. 123). It must be reminded
that Lachmann essentially viewed Hayek’s 1937 essay as “an attempt to set
Mises straight” (Hayek 1937; Selgin 1990, p. 35). Lachmann broadened
Hayek’s thesis, however. Within Austrian economics he represents the skepti-
cal position that no tendency toward equilibrium exists in markets. The par-
ticular problem emphasized by Lachmann is that of “divergent expectations”
(1976, p. 129). According to Lachman, expectations are autonomous. “We cannot
predict their mode of change as prompted by failure or success” (p. 129). The
notion of general equilibrium is to be abandoned, but that of individual equilib-
rium is to be retained at all costs ( p. 131).
Nevertheless, that is, despite their Lachmannian starting point, Cochran
and Glahe go on to point out that the special use of equilibrium analysis
employed in Austrian business cycle theory consists of: (a) setting up the
conditions existing in the economy at any particular time; (b) setting up the
equilibrium conditions for the same economy; the conditions required for
compatibility of all entrepreneurial plans; (c) compare (a) with (b). If the two
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are identical no changes can be expected in the economy until the data change.
If the two differ, the current conditions cannot continue. Changes can be
predicted. The equilibrium conditions can be a useful guide for impending
change. The comparison of the fictitious equilibrium state to the existing state
allows the economist to proceed from the diagnosis of the existing state of affairs
to a prognosis of what is likely to happen in the future (pp. 79 and 161). In the
Austrian business cycle theory an equilibrium concept is used not to describe
an actual state of a real economy, but to indicate directions of change (p. 157).
Moreover, this interpretation may seem somewhat questionable from a
Misesian viewpoint, in particular as regards the use of the equilibrium con-
struct for the purpose of predicting directions of change. On page 157 of the
book the authors quote Mises saying that “The static method, the employment
of the imaginary construction of an evenly rotating economy, is the only
adequate method of analyzing the changes concerned” (Mises 1998, p. 249).
Mises mentions the ceteris paribus condition where he clarifies that:
There is no means of studying the complex phenomena of action other
than first to abstract from change altogether, then to introduce an isolated
factor provoking change], and ultimately to analyze its effects under the
assumption that other things remain equal. (Mises 1998, pp. 248–49)
According to Mises “The assumption ceteris paribus is the self-evident
appendage of every scientific doctrine and there is no economic law that can
dispense with it” (Mises 1981, pp. 151–52). Lewin has correctly characterized
the evenly rotating economy as “an overriding ceteris paribus device” (Lewin
1997, p. 152). It is adopted in order to impose the most general type of ceteris
paribus conditions (p. 154). But as Mises himself makes clear “these other
things are never equal” (Mises 1998, p. 543). Nobody ever was or ever will be
in a position to observe a change in one of the market data ceteris paribus (p.
348). So the possibilities of (exact) prediction would be rather limited.1 But
even then the equilibrium construct would still be needed for the purpose of
theorizing. In fact Mises, contrary to the authors (p. 151), differentiates be-
tween different equilibrium concepts (Mises 1998, pp. 245–47).
The use of an imaginary construction of the evenly rotating economy as a
counterfactual and as a conceptual foil by itself does not yet warrant any claim
to the effect that it enables us to predict what is likely to happen in the real
world if entrepreneurs attempt to carry out any given set of plans, in particular, as
1Mises recognized that “prediction can never imply anything regarding quantitative
matters”(1998, p. 118). At best the use of the equilibrium construct would indeed allow us to
predict merely directions or tendencies of change since, as Mises points out, “Experience of
economic history is always experience of complex phenomena” (p. 348).
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will always be the case, when plans are not compatible. At least such extensive use
of the equilibrium concept would require some assumption or hypothesis about
how agents learn from experience, of how disappointment leads to the discovery
of new information, and to the alteration of plans as transactors try to attain the
most advantageous use of resources available (pp. 160–61). Even Lachmann admits
that “the divergence of expectations, apart from being an obstacle to equilib-
rium, has an important positive function in a market economy. It is an anticipa-
tory device” (Lachmann 1976, p. 131).
Much in the spirit of Lachmann’s work, it is today taken for granted that
the Hayekian insight into the dynamic adjustments of the process, the “exten-
sion of the equilibrium concept . . . from equilibrium analysis to the explana-
tion in terms of causal sequences” (Lachmann 1976, p. 161; see also Hayek 1941,
p. 23) constitutes a definite advance over Mises’s system. Hayek himself had
long maintained that his intention in 1937 had been to show Mises the deficien-
cies in the praxeological approach. The approach presented in the book under
review gives us reason, however, to pause and to ask ourselves again whether
this view is not exaggerated. From all reports Mises applauded Hayek’s (1937)
“Economics and Knowledge” paper and did not see it as an attack on his
system while Hayek thought it was. It can reasonably be argued that the “pure
logic of choice” has a great deal to say about the prerequisites for successful
action—notwithstanding our ignorance as to the mechanisms of social causa-
tion (Selgin 1990, p. 29). The book under review succeeds reasonably well in
consistently integrating the views of different Austrian writers.2
There are also differences between Mises’s and Hayek’s respective ac-
counts of the business cycle. Mises’s account rests almost solely upon his theory
of the components of the market rate of interest (Mises 1998, pp. 535–83). The
social time preference component (originary interest), the entrepreneurial com-
ponent and the price premium component of interest are indispensable in
Mises’s account of the trade cycle. In Mises’s presentation of trade cycle theory
in Human Action the Ricardo-effect argument plays no role at all.3 The Ricardo-
effect argument is usually invoked to explain why inflation-induced shifts in
resource allocation eventually will be reversed. 
2In fact there is reason to believe that Hayek misunderstood Mises’s position. This mis-
understanding may be related to the positivistic idea that the propositions of logic—in  casu
the logic of choice—cannot be but “merely” analytic, that is, devoid of empirical content.
Mises, however, rejected, the analytic–synthetic dichotomy (Mises 1976, p. 44). Contra
Hayek, it can be argued that the “pure logic of choice”—better is: logic of action—is not
merely a collection of empirically empty tautologies (see also Selgin 1990, pp. 28–29 and
passim).
3Mises discusses the Ricardo effect (pp. 767–70) in Human Action, but in a different
context.
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But again the differences between the theories of Hayek and Mises may be
more apparent than substantial in this respect. Hayek invoked the Ricardo
effect for a very specific purpose. Hayek provided the Ricardo-effect argument
only to show how the system would act if the rate of interest failed to act at all
(p. 141).4 It is more likely that the rate of interest will play a significant role that
affects entrepreneurial decisions in a manner similar to the Ricardo effect.
Investment cycles typically end in a credit crunch (see also O’Driscoll and
Rizzo 1985, p. 210). 
Other valuable features of the book are the following:
(1) A comparison of the respective views of Hayek and Keynes that high-
lights not only obvious differences but also the characteristics their views have
in common. Both Hayek and Keynes presented major challenges to classical
monetary theory. Both felt that a monetary economy differed from a barter
economy. These important differences were related to the use of money and
the role of time in the economic process (p. 175). Both used the Wicksellian
saving–investment approach as a basic tool of analysis and as the basis of their
investigation. However, as Hicks stated, “Wicksell plus Keynes said one thing,
Wicksell plus Hayek quite another” (p. 29). Whereas Keynes, starting from a
model similar to Wicksell’s, looked for the cause of economic problems by
disaggregating the financial sector, Hayek and Mises took the Wicksellian
change in the money rate relative to the natural rate as the cause of the cycle
and turned toward the real sector to analyze all the effects from this monetary
cause. But as is well-known, Keynes’s work led to policy conclusions that were
completely opposed to Hayek’s policy recommendations.
(2) A lucid discussion of the three general forms of quantity equations that
have appeared in the literature and of the ways in which they relate to the
4The authors (p. 66, n. 49 and p. 88, n. 65) mention the work of an early critic of Austrian
business cycle theory, namely Kaldor (1942) who had concluded that “On second thought
the theory was by no means so intellectually satisfying as it appeared at first” (p. 359).
According to Cochran and Glahe (p. 88) these problems are related to the fact that:
Hayek either abandoned or failed to fully use the monetary and capital
theory framework of Mises [1971]. He used a Walrasian intertemporal
equilibrium instead of the final state of rest [Mises 1966] or the Evenly
Revolving Economy, . . . the Austrian equilibrium concept, and abandoned
imputation theory and time preference interest theory.
Kaldor’s critique is not specifically addressed, however. Criticisms along the lines indi-
cated by Kaldor have been reiterated recently by Tyler Cowen (1997, p. 108). Cowen’s
comments still await detailed refutation. Cowen rejects the Ricardo effect as an account
of cyclical dynamics (p. 107). Cowen points out that workers in capital-intensive indus-
tries may find that their wages rise more quickly than do the prices of consumption
goods. To that extent, Cowen argues, the Ricardo effect does not reverse the capital-in-
tensive investments (p. 107). 
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Hayek–Keynes debate. Keynes’s dissatisfactions with the quantity equation
tools and the fundamental equations of the Treatise are equally briefly dis-
cussed (pp. 28–29, 31–34, 41–48). The three general forms are: (a) a transactions
equation, usually attributed to Irving Fisher, and called the equation of ex-
change. In its simplest form, it is written MV = PT. (b) The income form of the
equation of exchange, written MVy = Py. This form became popular as interest
shifted from long-run to short-run problems and economists, instead of concen-
trating on gross transactions, began to stress income transactions (p. 36). (c) A
third type of quantity equation is the Cambridge or cash balance equation,
M = kPy. A simple transformation of the Cambridge equation produces an
equation that looks similar to the income form of the transactions equation,
M(1/k) = Py. From this transformation, it appears that the Cambridge k is the
inverse of the income velocity (p. 39).
In a Hayekian structure of production framework the summation of the
money expenditure streams associated with each stage would represent the
PT = MV of a transaction equation (but only transactions associated with the
transfer of real goods and services are included). When national income or
national product is used as a foundation for macroeconomic analysis, empha-
sis is placed on the total money flow of expenditure on income (final) goods
and the related real flows (pp. 114–15). The predominate quantity equation
became the income form (p. 116).
(3) The book contains an updating and revision of the drama. The authors
argue that the Hayekian model can be introduced into the current debate as a
legitimate alternative not only to the Keynesian view but also to monetarist
and new classical approaches (p. 12). 
The first substantial achievement of the new classical macroeconomics was
to incorporate the rational-expectations hypothesis into the expectations-aug-
mented Phillips curve.5 The Phillips curve represents an inverse relationship
between inflation and unemployment. Friedman had argued that output and
unemployment would deviate from their natural rates only to the degree that
workers mistook inflation for changing relative prices (Friedman 1987). There
is no stable relationship between inflation and unemployment, only one be-
tween unanticipated inflation and unemployment. At the beginning of an infla-
tionary period, workers are slower than firms to recognize the full extent of the
5The rational-expectations hypothesis, in fact, is a subsidiary doctrine. The “new” ele-
ment in the new classical macroeconomics, which distinguishes it from monetarism and
other related schools of neoclassical macroeconomics, is the insistence that only a disaggre-
gative, Walrasian approach will do (Hoover 1998, p. 334). But any discussion of the ra-
tional-expectations hypothesis in macroeconomics must begin with the Phelps–Friedman
“natural-rate” revolution. 
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inflation, so they think that the higher nominal wages being offered are actu-
ally higher real wages. With this apparent higher real wage, workers offer
more labor services, people accept jobs rather than keep searching for better
ones, and the unemployment rate falls. When workers realize they have mis-
judged the inflation rate, they withdraw some of their labor, some workers quit
their jobs, and the unemployment rate returns to its “natural rate.” 
Rational expectations theorists began with the natural-rate hypothesis but
posed the following question: Why should participants in the economy be
systematically “fooled” by the inflation rate? Robert Lucas argued that the
rational expectations hypothesis and flexible prices implied that such mistakes
were unsystematic and fleeting.
The mistakes in predicting inflation would have to be random; mistakes can be
made, but the public can never be systematically fooled about the inflation rate.
Movements in the unemployment rate from its natural rate can still occur when
mistakes are made in predicting inflation, but these errors must be random. 
The supposedly unique or new aspect of the natural unemployment rate
hypothesis is its prediction about policy. The new classical analysis of the
Phillips curve led immediately to Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace’s (1975)
well-known “policy-ineffectiveness proposition”: aggregate monetary policy
could not systematically alter real outcomes.
The implication of this view for the potency of monetary policy is indeed
startling. The natural unemployment rate hypothesis and its later develop-
ments in the rational expectations hypothesis purported to show that any fully
anticipated monetary policy would be ineffective. Only the unanticipated
growth of the money supply can make the actual inflation rate diverge from
the expected inflation rate. The theory implies that the effects of a nonaccelerat-
ing monetary disturbance will be self-reversing. An expansion of the money
supply at a constant rate will cause the economy to first expand and then without
any further exogenous changes contract, and vice versa for a monetary contrac-
tion. The natural-rate theory explains a cycle in terms of a response to a single
“shock.” In the long run, the policy is ineffective; real phenomena ultimately
dominate purely monetary influences. The natural unemployment rate hy-
pothesis has a self-reversing component.
The relevant policy elements contained in the Hayek–Mises model are
similar to those contained in the natural unemployment-rate model . The need
to expand the money supply at an accelerating rate to maintain the initial
output effects of an expansionary monetary policy had been part of the Aus-
trian business cycle theory long before the development of the natural-rate
model. In fact, the Austrian business cycle theory like (and prior to) the natural
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unemployment theory has both a self-reversing and an accelerationist compo-
nent. Monetary changes are self-reversing. A monetary expansion at a con-
stant rate will cause first an expansion then a contraction of the economy.
Monetary policy is ineffective in the long run. The increased employment
initially caused by a monetary expansion can only be maintained if the money
supply continues to increase at a progressive rate.
It is recognized that Hayek’s monetary policy conclusions are quite similar
to those arrived at on the basis of the new classical analysis. The Hayekian
model implies policy ineffectiveness. Policy will not only be ineffective in the
long run, it will also cause future instability. As I pointed out the so-called
“policy ineffectiveness proposition” is also a celebrated conclusion of the new
classical analysis (Sargent and Wallace 1975). Perhaps for this reason non-Aus-
trian economists are largely unaware of the major differences between the
Hayek–Mises theory of business cycles and the new classical equilibrium
business cycle theory. 
The perception of the problem that is the starting point of the analysis in the
Austrian theory differs from the starting point of the new classical analysis. In
the Hayek–Mises model monetary changes are the necessary cause of system-
atic distortions of relative prices (p. 158). As he Austrian theory is indeed a
theory of “business cycles without rational expectations” (Cowen 1997, p. 76).
In fact Austrian theory assumes that market participants can be expected to
make use of information conveyed by prices along with other particular
knowledge that they might have, but they cannot be expected to know the
parameters of the economy’s structure (Bellante and Garrison 1988, pp. 213–14).
Entrepreneurs will trade largely on the basis of their market savvy, which is
derived from their reading of prices, wage rates, and interest rates. That is, as
Hayek would say, they act on the basis of their knowledge of particular
circumstances of time and place, but they cannot be expected to behave as if
they have an economist’s understanding of the structure of the economy. The
absence of such theoretical knowledge at the level of entrepreneurs is what
gives plausibility to the Austrian theory of the business cycle. For entrepre-
neurs to distinguish clearly and quickly between real and nominal changes
would require, among other things, that they have a substantial grasp on
Hayek’s second kind of knowledge. 
This assumption is part of the antecedent conditioning the applicability of
the theory, but it is clearly at odds with the rational expectations hypothesis. The
rational expectations hypothesis asserts that economic agents form expectations
consistent with the forecasts of the maintained model (Hoover 1998, p. 334). It was
originally formulated by John Muth in 1960, and Robert Lucas and Thomas
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Sargent introduced it into macroeconomics about 1970 as a way of avoiding
the implication of the then prevailing models that economic agents made
systematic and correctable errors in forming expectations.
The technical role of rational expectations is to maintain consistency: the new
classicals argue that the models should not ascribe to the agents they model
expectations that are different from the ones they would form as outsiders
using the model to describe the economy. In other words, the model should
not confer an informational advantage on the econometrician over the mod-
elled agent (Hoover 1998, p. 336). Moreover, such expectations must be unbi-
ased: they must not produce systematic, remediable expectional errors.
In contrast two assumptions about expectations characterize the Austrian
theory: (a) the entrepreneurs do not already know—and cannot behave as if they
already know—the underlying economic realities whose changing charac-
teristics are conveyed by changes in prices, wages, and interest rates, and (b)
prices, wages, and interest rates tend to facilitate the coordination of economic
decisions and to keep those decisions in line with the underlying economic
realities (Garrison 2000, chap. 2).
Whereas the new classical analysis the rational expectation hypothesis is
conceived as a consistency axiom, that is, it refers only to the relationship between
the assumption about expectations and the theory in which it is incorporated,
inserting that same hypothesis into Austrian theory would involve an inconsis-
tency. It is not logically consistent to claim (a) that the entrepreneurs already
have—or behave as if they already have—the information about the underly-
ing economic realities independent of current prices, wage rates, and interest
rates and (b) that it is prices, wage rates, and interest rates that convey this
information. This difference between the two models is fundamental.
Furthermore, the central feature of the Hayek-Mises discussion is the
Wicksell mechanism, not the Phillips curve. In the Hayek–Mises model the real
responses to a monetary change depend on the initial distribution effects of the
monetary change. In the natural rate and new classical models any real re-
sponses are dependent upon unanticipated monetary changes.
According to certain radical exponents of the new classical economics, any
predictable part of the money supply should have no effect on output, employ-
ment, or any other real variables in the economy. Only unpredictable money-
supply changes can affect output (Sheffrin 1996, p. 35). Surely Hayek did not
reach the same conclusion.
Hayek would not agree that a fully announced set of policy changes will
have no effect on real macroeconomic variables. Stimulative policies may have
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short-run beneficial effects, but these beneficial effects will be at the expense of
long-run disruptions (see also Moss and Vaughn 1986, p. 565).
Hayek argues that the transmission mechanism is extremely important.
The path of the economy following a monetary disturbance is a disequilibrium
path, not an equilibrium path. Whereas the new classical writers develop
equilibrium models of the business cycle, the Hayek–Mises model provides a
disequilibrium explanation of the cycle. In the Austrian model, monetary
disturbances cause cycles because ordinarily reliable prices give false signals.
Production is misdirected: monetary changes alter relative prices in such a
way that plans based on these false prices direct the use of resources so that
economic activity is not coordinated (p. 163).
Whereas the macro-adjustment processes developed in the natural rate
and the new classical models are still in the form of causal relationships between
broad aggregates, Hayek’s predictions depend on the monetary change affect-
ing different sectors unequally. Austrians work at a lower level of aggrega-
tion in order to allow for the outputs of the investment-goods sector and the
consumer-goods sector to move relative to one another and even to allow for
differential movements within the investment-goods sector. The economy’s
production process is disaggregated into a number of temporally se-
quenced stages of production. Replacing the single investment aggregate
with temporally sequenced stages that make up the economy’s capital
structure is exactly what provides a basis for a substantive distinction
between sustainable and unsustainable growth (Garrison 1996b).
The Hayek–Mises theory is capital-based, not labor-based. While monetar-
ism and new classicism are based on the intertemporal substitutability within
the market for labor, Austrianism is based on the intertemporal complemen-
tarity within the market for capital goods (Bellante and Garrison 1988, p. 208).6
In several ways the Hayek–Mises theory is a theory about the upward
turning point and its inevitability, the end of the boom and the beginning of the
downturn (p. 107). It does not rely on quits to explain increased unemploy-
ment. Instead it gives an argument that shows why excess capacity and layoffs
6As a reminder: in Hayek’s opinion, the rate of profit is the ultimate determinant of the
form of investment. In long-run equilibrium, the rate of profit is equivalent to what in the
real analysis was called the rate of interest, the margins between prices and costs. It is these
margins which Hayek refers to as the key relative prices that are altered by monetary
changes. It is the marginal rate of profit that will adjust to the market rate of interest. How-
ever, the initial effect on price margins will be at least partially reversed. The rate of profit
should first decrease and then increase. The pattern of expenditure based on the tastes of
consumers will tend to reassert itself as the money expenditure flows through the system.
So Austrians tell their business-cycle stories in terms of changes in the interest rate rather
than changes in the wage rate, because their theory is capital based rather than labor based. 
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may become prevalent (p. 195). In addition, the analysis does not rule out
Keynesian type contractions following the initial crises. Once unemployed
resources develop, a “secondary deflation” (Hayek 1969, p. 176) or Keynesian
type collapse is likely (p. 144).
So what is the upshot? The essential insights characterizing the Austrian theory
of industrial fluctuations relate to (a) the self-reversing nature of monetary changes
(pp. 125–27) and (b) the accelerationist component of the theory (p. 142). The
authors elucidate these characteristics with the aid of some highly illuminating
numerical examples (see pp. 125–27 and 142). The Austrian business cycle
theory like (and prior to) the natural unemployment theory has both a self-re-
versing and an accelerationist component:
(1) Relative price changes brought about by monetary factors are not
equilibrium relative prices, that is, the prices are not consistent with the under-
lying real factors. The systematic distortion of relative prices misdirects pro-
duction temporarily. But as economic agents discover that plans are not coor-
dinated, real forces will reassert themselves. The misdirection is corrected and
cyclical phenomena are observed (p. 159). This is not meant to imply, however,
that relative prices will, in general, return to their previous, pre-boom levels.
(2) An injection of additional money and credit through the banking sys-
tem can postpone the need for adjustment (if the stress is laid upon the word
postpone). However, the additional increases in the effective quantity of money
must be progressively larger if the new conditions are to be maintained and the
crisis is to be avoided (pp. 139–40).
The policy recommendation is similar but not totally identical, however. In
Prices and Production Hayek (1935) recommended the constant-MV norm for the
exercise of monetary policy. Hayek argued that macroeconomic coordination is
best promoted by a constant MV. The implied monetary rule, then, is: Increase M
to offset decreases in V, but allow decreases in P to accommodate increases in T.
He had not argued, however, that the rule would ensure neutrality, a view
wrongly imputed to him by Sraffa (1995, p. 199; see also Steele 1996, p. 132; and
Hayek 1935, p. 131). 
In the monetarist view, to the contrary, so long as the price level is stable,
monetary expansion is not disruptive. Monetary expansion may even be neces-
sary to keep prices from falling during periods of real economic growth. The
monetarist recommendation, then, becomes: increase the supply of money to
match long-term, secular increases in real output. The Austrian recommen-
dation, in contrast, is to abstain from monetary expansion even in periods of
economic growth; increasing output should be accommodated by a declining
price level (Bellante and Garrison 1988, p. 227).
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UNSOLVED PROBLEM?
The authors recognize as an important aim of business-cycle research that the
understanding it provides “may help reform financial markets and banking in
ways that could prevent or reduce the impact of monetary induced business
cycles” (p. xi) and they state that, “It is only through a greater under-
standing of the forces actually shaping events in a monetary production
economy that we can make rational decisions about policy and monetary
institutions” (p. 166). 
It is recognized that the work of Mises and Hayek can be characterized as a
constitutional approach to monetary problems: the search is not for a proper
policy but for an appropriate monetary framework (p. 166, n. 136). Constitu-
tional economics examines the choice of constraints as opposed to the choice
within constraints (Van den Hauwe 1999, p. 101). In recent times it was mainly
through Hayek’s The Denationalization of Money that the debate over monetary
policy was again reconceived as a more fundamental debate over monetary
regimes (White 1999a, p. 117).
The cycle depends on the elasticity of bank credit; the characteristic of a
modern financial system that allows the supply of money credit to differ from
the supply of credit based on real saving (p. 120). The operations of a devel-
oped banking financial system will tend to retard the operation of the interest-
rate brake (p. 166). Economists study different institutional arrangements to
determine which type of institution is most likely to minimize this tendency
for the market rate to be reduced below the natural rate. 
But this crucial point relating to the institutional underpinnings of the
business-cycle phenomenon is not elaborated by the authors. What are the
necessary or sufficient institutional conditions for the prevention of recurring
business cycles and for securing macroeconomic coordination? Can economic
coordination be achieved through central banking? Would it require the aboli-
tion of fractional-reserve banking? Or can economic coordination be best
guaranteed by some variant of fractional-reserve free banking? It is precisely
with regard to these questions and their answers that not only Hayek, Mises,
and Rothbard but also contemporary economists all working within the Aus-
trian tradition hold different and sometimes contradictory views.
Mises argued that, “Free banking is the only method available for the
prevention of the dangers inherent in credit expansion” (1998, p. 440). Accord-
ing to Mises, “[t]he establishment of free banking was never seriously consid-
ered precisely because it would have been too efficient in restricting credit
expansion” (p. 438). According to Mises natural forces limit the increase in
fiduciary media.
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A bank can never issue more money-substitutes than its clients can
keep in their cash holdings. The individual client can never keep a
larger portion of his total cash holding in money-substitutes than that
corresponding to the proportion of his turnover with other clients of
his bank to his total turnover. (Mises 1998, p. 435)
In recent times Mises’s theme has been taken up again by the fractional-re-
serve free bankers. According to the free bankers the aforementioned constant
MV-norm would get implemented automatically by competitive forces in a
system of fractional-reserve free banking. Free banking would thus automat-
ically discriminate between real disturbances and monetary disturbances,
reacting only to the latter (Selgin 1988, pp. 64–69; see also Garrison 1996a).
Given the authors’ explicit acknowledgment of the influence of Roger Garri-
son’s work on their own (p. xiii) one might guess that they would favor the
fractional-reserve free banking solution but the book contains no explicit
confirmation or statement of this view.
Surely there remains a certain ambiguity in this context. As the authors
point out, “Hayek was arguing that cyclical activity will be a standard feature
of an economy with an elastic currency; an economy where the supply of money
either wholly or partially responds to changes in the demand for money or the demand
for credit” (p. 75; emphasis is added). Although the primary concern of the
fractional-reserve free bankers does not relate to the question of how to avoid
Hayekian cycles, they seem to hold the view that in a free banking system
where the supply of bank money responds automatically to changes in de-
mand to hold bank money “disequilibrium situations depicted by monetary
business cycle theories, such as Hayek’s (1935), are avoided” (see, e.g., Selgin
1996, pp. 103–07). Only issuance of additional fiduciary media in excess of the
demand to hold them generates injection effects and sets in motion the trade
cycle.7 However, it should be remembered that Mises held the view that
“issuance of additional fiduciary media, no matter what its quantity may be,
always sets in motion those changes in the price structure the description of
which is the task of the theory of the trade cycle” (Mises 1998, p. 439, n. 17). 
In a more recent publication the ambiguity is resolved, however. Like the
Rothbardians (see Hoppe, Hülsmann, and Block 1998) the authors view
money creation in a fractional-reserve banking system as a credit creation
process and recognize that credit creation is not financial intermediation.
Money and credit-creation is a self-reversing process with the potential to
generate cycles that could be prevented by avoiding credit creation. Money is a
present good. A bank deposit (redeemable at par on demand) is not a debt
7Larry White, personal correspondence.
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transaction but a bailment in its economic impact even if it is treated as a debt
by the legal system. There subsists an important difference between Mises’s
approach and that of the Rothbardians, however. Mises saw no fraudulent
behavior in the development of fractional-reserve banking. According to
Mises “What is needed to prevent any further credit expansion is to place
the banking business under the general rules of commercial and civil laws
compelling every individual and firm to fulfill all obligations in full compliance
with the terms of the contract” (Mises 1998, p. 440). The Rothbardians to the
contrary ground their rejection of fiduciary media in libertarian ethics.
It remains an open question whether the fact that the book does not
explicitly pronounce in favor of one of these solutions over another must be
considered one of its virtues rather than a major defect. At this moment the
debate seems to be settled in favor of the Rothbardian view that “the root of
all evil” is fractional-reserve banking and fiduciary media. On the other hand
it must be recognized that Hayek looked at these matters rather differently.
At the time he engaged in business-cycle research, he never endorsed lais-
sez-faire in banking. Hayek viewed the freedom of bankers to vary the stock
of money as a source of disequilibrating shocks. According to Hayek the
impulse initiating unsustainable cyclical booms was often the failure of the
market rate of interest to rise with the equilibrium or natural rate when the
demand for loanable funds increased. He elaborated Thomas Joplin’s argu-
ment as to how commercial banks responded to an increase in loan demand by
varying only the quantity of loans and not the price (Hayek 1935, pp. 15–17).
White has argued that the Joplin–Hayek argument is unfounded: in a
competitive banking system the loan and deposit rates of interest should be
expected to track the natural rate. Hayek underestimated the strength of
self-correcting forces in a competitive banking system (White 1999b, p. 767).
FURTHER RESEARCH
The purpose of the authors is not explicitly polemical. The classic Mises–
Hayek theory has been under serious attack recently, especially by Tyler
Cowen (Cowen 1997). Except for Sechrest’s (1998) critical review in this journal
Cowen’s “new” Austrian perspective has gone largely uncriticized until the
present. It is to be expected that the book under review will serve as a useful
guide to further debate and criticism in this context.
Much of Cowen’s argumentation centers on the question of how likely and
to what extent entrepreneurs are “fooled” or “confused” by a policy-induced
change in the interest rate. The discussion takes the form of a comparison of
Austrian views with those of the modern new classical school.
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Though the terminology, especially the idea of being “fooled,” is common
to both schools, it has a literal meaning in the context of new classical models,
where the model economy is an exceedingly simple one, and a metaphorical
meaning in the context of Austrian theory, which deals with a complex market
system. In new classical theory, there is typically one signal—the wage
rate—whose changes might be interpreted in two ways (nominal or real) and
one real variable—leisure preferences—that may or may not have changed. In
such a simple model economy, the theorist must contrive reasons to account
for anyone ever being “fooled” by anything.8 The standard argument involves
islands whose wage rates are affected locally by real shocks and globally by
nominal shocks. On a given island, there may be some confusion for a time
about whether the latest shock was a real one. Hence, people may be fooled, if
only temporarily, by a nominal shock.  According to Cowen: “The Austrian
claim postulates systematic entrepreneurial errors in the most costly possible
direction. . . . The Austrian claim not only violates rational expectations but
requires an especially severe naïveté” (Cowen 1997, pp. 81–82).
 It is important to see that the theory has a conditional, that is, an if–then
structure. Even if empirical evidence would establish, in a particular historical
context, that entrepreneurs are unlikely to be “fooled” in the aforementioned
sense, this kind of critique might well leave the Austrian theoretical edifice
intact. The criticism would relate to questions of applicability in a particular
instance, not to the theoretical validity of the theory. The theory only claims
that, ceteris paribus, given the instantiation of the facts enunciated in the as-
sumptions, the consequences follow. And that theory still stands. 
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